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Introduction 
 
Back in the early 2000s most experts and politicians believed that Lukashenka was and would 
remain Moscow’s puppet, emphasizing Moscow’s (super) influence over Belarus. However by 2004 
Moscow seemed to have exhausted its political potential to control the Lukashenka regime. This was 
partly due to new measures adopted by Minsk which opposed pressure from Moscow, alleviating 
tensions in bilateral relations. This has meant Moscow is continuing to provide economic assistance 
regardless, due to various reasons which will be discussed in this paper. 
 
Belarusian opposition parties committed certain policy blunders and have lost their biggest issues, 
the independence of the nation, by not taking the general political aim of Lukashenka in bargaining 
with Russia into account. They expected Russia to terminate its economic support toward the 
regime with a major social-economic crisis and mass protests following.  The fact remains that 
Lukashenka has mastered his ability to haggle and hold rigid talks with Moscow, suggesting that he 
could further prolong his already 13 years rule, albeit within a different dynamic with Russia to that 
of the past. 
 
Summary of Main Points 
 
• A change in attitude from Minsk has created a more independent stance towards Russia from 
Lukashenka and the circle that surround him. 
• The continuing cycle of relations has resulted in a current thaw in Russian pressure on Belarus, 
due to both internal priorities and external pressures.  
• Minsk preferring to work with Western companies who show ‘sensitivity’ to the current situation 
in Belarus, whilst cautiously developing Russian business, ever-mindful of the dangers of greater 
political pressure.  
• Russian standpoint towards Belarus can be explained via three viewpoints; economic, geo-
political/military and political. 
• Despite Russian enthusiasm, a union between the two countries is unlikely. 
 
 
Cycles and Thaws – Milking the Brother 
 
It is possible to depict a certain cycle in Belaruso-Russian relations which goes as follows - Russia 
defines its demands, pressurizes Belarus for concessions and backs down until the status-quo is 
restored and a thaw sets in. In an abridged form, the following chain of events can be traced: 
formulation of demands – pressure – a thaw. Such a scheme was evident from May 2001 till 
November 2002 and from March 2003 till August 2004. First the Russian leaders conditioned the 
recognition of the official 2001 electoral results upon the sale of several Belarusian enterprises to 
Russian companies, but Lukashenka withstood the pressure. Furthermore, Russian leaders believed 
that Lukashenka, being in need of Russian recognition for the outcome of the referendum on his 
“third term”, would once again concede on the issue of enterprise privatization. This thaw was 
partly caused by Russia entering a struggle with the Western countries over Ukraine. After 2004 the 
major goal of the next thaw was to acquire the majority share in “Beltransgaz”. 
 
The reasons for the thaw in pressure in this case were both internal factors (the impending 
presidential elections in Russia and the new economic stance toward CIS in order to increase 
payments for gas), but also foreign policy issues2. Russian interest in Belarus has simply slid down 
the list of priorities for Moscow. As these issues remain, the cyclic recurrence in Belaruso-Russian 
relations is likely to continue. Despite the woes of Russian politicians claiming that the Belarusian 
                                                 
2 For example, the critical assessment of the Russian parliamentary elections by the West; the overall negative 
stance of the Western countries to the authoritarian tendencies in Russia against the background of 
antagonism between Russia and the West, including the issues of NATO bases deployment in the territory of 
the new alliance members; the perspective of installing US anti-missile defence system elements in Poland and 
the Czech Republic; the cooperation of Ukraine with the EU and NATO; Georgia’s proposed entry to NATO; the 
widening of cooperation between the West and GUAM and the CIS bloc of states; the issue of Kosovo; 
contradictions concerning military and technical cooperation between Russia, Iran, China and several other 
states; clashes with Western countries concerning the status of the Russian minority in the Baltic states, etc. 
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regime is milking “the Great Russia” as a “cash cow”, the model of relations introduced during 
Yeltsin times, which presumes economic and political support in exchange for Belarus being a 
strategic ally rather than a vassal, remains intact. However,  demands of Moscow this time run 
higher with the increasing gas price, but the Belarusian ruling elite retains the leeway to avoid 
making concessions and not to give Moscow what it wants fully.  
 
The introduction of changes into this cycle recurrence was only possible when Russian business 
purchases the “system-grounding” Belarusian enterprises. However today, after seven years of 
struggle between Moscow and the Belarusian regime for economic and political domination in 
Belarus, the former finds itself further away from its goal than it was in 2001. 
 
The Rouble Trap - Mine the Gaps    
 
The (recently found) independence of Belarus has meant a new high status, which is now occupied 
by Lukashenka and a large group of his governmental officials. Usurping the nationalistic flag 
previously being waved only by the opposition, this inner circle had has a monopolist control over 
the Belarusian market. During the current period of primary accumulation of funds through a rather 
slow “official” privatization the regime representatives have viewed the democratization of 
Belarusian society as going contrary to their interests. The same goes for the cautious appearance 
of Western business structures in Belarus, however necessary they are deemed to be needed, 
especially in counterweighing Russian money (and so influence). The inner circle does not feel well-
prepared for the arrival of strong competitors in the Belarusian market and are scared to comply 
with rules stipulated by the market conditions. Therefore they prefer to work with those Western 
companies, from Austria the foremost, showing necessary “sensitiveness” to their dilemma.  
 
The growing pressure on Russian business structures in Belarus doesn’t correspond to their 
interests either. They are aware of the fact that a reinforcement of Russian economic presence in 
Belarus will lead to a dictation of rules by Russian business – the domineering business-political 
group in Russia, to be precise. Although discussing the perspectives of integration and even close 
connections formed the idea of “sister nations” with the Russian governmental officials, Minsk is 
trying to “mine” the existing gaps as privately the Belarusian top executives talk about the 
possibilities of restraining Russia politically. At the same time as developing trade and economic 
cooperation with their eastern neighbor. This position corresponds to the present wide-spread mood 
in Belarusian society. Even rather apolitically-minded people in Belarus recollect a large range of 
Russian problems, while discussing the perspectives of political integration with Russia. The list 
includes the ‘hot’ Northern Caucasian region with its epicenter in Chechnya, alongside poverty in the 
regions, and manifestations of “wild capitalism”. However, the broad negative attitude towards 
political integration with Russia co-exists with a more positive attitude towards trade and economic 
cooperation with their eastern neighbor, as it ensures regular salaries and central heating in houses, 
as well as the possibility to consume and “to live well”. The understanding of the “Lukashenka 
consumers” about the Union State is opening up the Russian market for Belarusian goods, and 
cheap energy from Russia; but nothing beyond this.  
 
Following the current mood and interests of Belarusian top executives and society in general, 
Lukashenka’s administration is obviously aiming at imposing its original scheme of relations 
between Belarus and Russia upon the Kremlin. Accordingly, Moscow is expected to pay a good price 
to Belarus for playing the part of its strategic ally and being its “shield” and “outpost” in the western 
direction. At the same time, it is supposed that Russia will not demand from its ally, any 
transformation into its vassal. Nevertheless, speaking frequently about an “equal” relationship 
(based on the real Belarusian understanding of the Union State) Lukashenka truly is representing 
the majority of Belarusian citizens, which has helped him to shift his popular support on pragmatic 
foundations.  
 
Russian Policy Towards Belarus: My Way  
 
While where Belarus stands is clear, the Russian policy toward Belarus is more in the clouds. It is 
possible to determine three views upon which Russian state policy bases its relations with Belarus.  
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1) Some Belarusian liberal economists believe that the stance of Russia to Belarus can be explained 
by the interests of “Gazprom” and other large Russian companies, interested in an increase in 
capitalization. In other words, Russia’s primary focus is money, and nothing else. They hope that 
the arrival of Russian business to Belarus and the purchase of controlling shares of Belarusian 
enterprises by Russian companies will have an exclusive positive effect. Hence, the “market wave” 
on the part of Russia will weaken the authoritarian regime and create restrictions to Lukashenka’s 
power. This opinion reflects the position of Russian-speaking and culturally Russian part of 
Belarusian intellectuals, dreaming of the construction of a Russian-speaking and culturally Russian, 
but also liberal market society in Belarus, without the traditional “illnesses” and authoritarian 
tendencies, peculiar to Russian society.3 During the time of Yeltsin’s presidency and in the first 
years of Putin’s presidency, these representatives were talking about the possibility of 
“implementing democratization in Belarus through Russia”. In other words, the people believed that 
Russian influence could foster democracy-building processes in Belarus.   
 
2) According to the next opinion, geopolitical interests determine Russia’s policy in relation to 
Belarus. Russia tends to create firm guarantees of having Belarus as a strategic ally of Russia, its 
“shield” and “outpost”, from Lukashenka or other Belarus officials. This is regularly reinforced by the 
ritual rhetoric of Lukashenka in Russian media outlets. The Kremlin aims at creating solid 
instruments of political influence upon Belarus through reinforcement of Russia’s economic presence 
in the country, purchasing of controlling shares of backbone Belarusian enterprises by Russian 
companies, and the unification of monetary systems. Moreover, the Kremlin hopes to create 
stronger connections between the top executives of Belarus and Russia due to a commonly enjoyed 
material welfare.  
 
Those supporting this opinion believe the policy doesn’t jeopardize the status of Belarus as a state. 
Accordingly, Russia doesn’t have plans to incorporate Belarus, as the Kremlin understands very well 
that such actions will have negative consequences for its relations with the West and other CIS 
members, not to mention the predominantly negative attitude of Belarusian society towards political 
integration with Russia. In the meantime the Kremlin has the understanding that Minsk will not go 
bankrupt immediately after gas prices have been increased, whilst disbelieving Lukashenka’s ability  
to pursue real political openness and liberalization (and the West’s willingness to embrace him 
without), thus waiting for an economically weaker Minsk to seize the political moment.  
 
3) According to this last point of view, Russia has been implementing a step-by-step strategy with 
the aim of incorporation of Belarus into the Russian Federation. The first step includes the purchase 
of controlling shares of backbone Belarusian enterprises by Russian companies. The second step 
envisages the unification of monetary systems. It is supposed to be followed by the Constitutional 
Act of “the Union State of Belarus and Russia”, while the Union’s institutions will be formed with the 
prevalence of the Russian party. Consequently, they will get real influence upon the political 
process in Belarus. Finally, Russia is expected to increase its military presence in Belarus and create 
the legislative base for military integration. Each step will be accompanied by certain changes in 
attitude towards political integration on the part of the Belarus’ ruling elite. They will appear more 
and more attached to their Moscow “partners”. Simultaneously, the Russian lobby will make efforts 
in order to change the attitude towards political integration with Russia on the part of Belarusian 
society from a negative to positive or, at least, neutral stance. These steps should result in reaching 
the required level of inner preparedness for Belarus to accept the loss of its independence and to 
create the necessary preconditions for the country’s incorporation with Russia. The incorporation 
process will be so natural in this case that the political circles of a number of concerned EU states 
won’t see any other possible perspective for Belarus and alternative ways of political development 
for Belarusian society.  
 
Union Scenario Development: Broking the Power  
 
Certainly it might be possible to treat the third view on the Belarus policy of Russia as a fairy tale. 
However, there are some signs which, taking into account the current political development in 
                                                 
3 For many years Lukashenka was supporting this idea by such statement as “Belarusians are Russians only with a trademark 
of quality”.   
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Russia and the increasing contradiction between relations between Russia and the West, this may 
have a growing influence on the development of relations between Belarus and Russia. Part of the 
Russian political elite sees (in the long term) the incorporation of Belarus and Ukraine as the only 
possible response to the challenges of pro-China and pro-Muslim trends in Russia. One of the 
reasons for this is the concern over the loss of control over the rich natural resources territories to 
the east of Ural, taking into account the increasing demographic and other pressure on the part of 
China. Out of 142 million total Russian population around 35 million Russians reside to the east of 
Ural.  The living conditions of the vast region borders on China are severe, with many residents 
lacking even drinking water. On the other hand there is an estimated 9 million Chinese living in the 
territory of Russia. There is a lack of public acknowledgment of this issue by Russian experts and 
politicians. To counter this, according to certain sources the population of Russia should amount to 
300 – 500 million people to be on the safe side. Taking into account the cultural and religious 
specifics of ethnic groups that form the population of Russia, the implementation of Russia’s 
“national demographic plans” will facilitate misbalance between the Slavic and non-Slavic, the 
Christian and Muslim parts of local population.  
 
Additionally, even after 17 years of independence the Russian political elite and society tends to 
accept neither Belarus nor Ukraine as independent countries, but regarded as constituent parts of 
the Russian influence sphere and “land”.  Similarly, the national revival of Ukrainian (and to a less 
extent in Belarus) is regarded by Russia as an artificial process and a deviation from the proper way 
of development. Thus, the Russian Foreign Office stated its deep concern with “heroization of the 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army”. Russian top executives declared the policy may cause possible 
deterioration of relations with Ukraine.  The 200-year Russification policy in Belarus during times of 
Russian rule has led to even more dramatic results. Either consciously or unconsciously having in 
view the results of the long-term Russification policy in Belarus, Russians regard the Belarusians as 
a part of the Russian nation.   
 
This goes hand in hand with the notion of Great Russia, the trade mark of the Putin presidency. At 
the same time, the terms “White Russia” (Belarus) and “Small Russia” (Ukraine) are used more and 
more frequently in discussions on Russian history as a basis for the nation’s future as well as in 
relation to the historical mission of Russia. Modern Russian historical scientists talk again about 
occupation of “Russian lands” (i.e., Belarusian and Ukrainian ethnic territories) by the Poles and the 
Lithuanians as well as about “Russian people’s” (i.e., the Belarusians and the Ukrainians’) fight with 
the invaders. 
 
Nevertheless, according to current international and domestic political situation, and perhaps the 
existent public sentiments and views within the Russian society, the second scenario is likely to 
continue for a middle term perspective. This is further reinstated by the, albeit very few in numbers, 
most serious experts dealing with Belarus. According to Sergey Karaganov of the Russian Council on 
Foreign and Defence Policy, Russia has three major objectives as per Belarus, namely 1) secure 
steady communication with the Kaliningrad enclave, 2) influence Belarus to stay out of the EU and 
NATO, 3) retain stable and cheap transit of goods through Belarus. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite increasing national pride at home, it won’t be enough for Minsk to re-visit as blatantly as 
possible the ageing geopolitical contract with Moscow, just in order to avoid paying significantly 
more for fuel supplies as other CIS countries are facing.4  Lukashenka’s effort to play the power 
broker to continuously blackmail Moscow with (faking) opening up toward the West to avoid playing 
the energy bill in full will certainly continue with the new Russian duumvirate of Medvedev and 
Putin. However, as Moscow already knows, both the Belarusians and the West should realize that 
Lukashenka is running out of time and resources. If Lukashenka won’t be willing to liberalize 
according to its rhetoric, and the West remains united in its policy toward Minsk, the danger of 
economic usurpation of Belarus might be closer than all of the gamblers may think.    
                                                 
4 Lukashenka himself revealed at the interview with Ria Novosti on February 18, 2008 that Belarus is facing to double that 
$119/1,000 cubic meters of natural gas of Gazprom from April 1, 2008. Similar agreement is believed to make with Ukrainian 
President Yuschenko during his tri to Moscow on February 12, 2008.  
